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A Sign of the Times.

Looking over the newspaper opinions on the Philippine question it is seen that the number of clear-minded journals in favor of retaining the entire group is so very large as to be nearly if not quite a majority; that the number of newspapers which are still without final conviction as to the wisdom of incorporating the Philippines into the United States dominion, but condemn the idea of returning them to Spain, is also large; and that those in favor of abandoning the Philippines entirely are trifling in number and, as a rule, inseparable adherents of the unhappy and stranded BRYAN or conspicuous members of the anti-Hawaii cuckoo crew of Mugwumps that always think and speak of the United States people and Government with a scowl.

But few can be so dull as not to know that while if the Mugwumps should be beaten and our flag established in the Philippines a little indulgence in complaint and criticism would be the sum of their response, if the annexationists were disappointed, their indignation and resentment would be bitter and overwhelming.

Destiny has put the Philippine Islands into the hands of the United States at a most opportune moment. What statesman will have the alien's hardihood to cast them out?

Mr. McKinley Accepts the Responsibility.

The Monterey reached Manila yesterday, and preparations are making at San Francisco for the transport of more troops for Gen. MERRITT. From the day when the news of our great victory at Manila reached Washington such preparations for following it up by the permanent establishment of our power in the Philippines have been made unintermittently. The apprehension of serious trouble with the insurgent chief, AGUIBALDO, which existed at one time, probably more here than in the minds of Gen. MERRITT and Admiral DREWY at Manila, does not seem to be justified by the latest reports from the islands.

In spite of all these facts pointing so obviously to the determination of the Administration to hold the Philippines, there are newspapers which are still drawing the inference from the language of our general terms for peace, now accepted by Spain, that the intention of Mr. McKinley is to abandon them, with the exception of a bare coaling station.

The truth is that the reference of the question of the Philippines to the negotiations which are to follow that acceptance leaves their disposition practically in the hands of Mr. McKinley. Military and naval operations for their conquest having ceased and having been succeeded by peaceful negotiation, the responsibility for the decision of the question rests with him. He makes himself, his Administration, and his party accountable to the American people for the settlement of what has come to be the main question growing out of the war, or the extension and development of American power and commerce in the East. This responsibility he has accepted voluntarily, and we believe, fortunately for the American people, his whole course toward the Philippines since the victory of DREWY at Cavite indicating very plainly that the settlement he has in his mind will be in agreement with their hopes and desires.

President McKinley has not invited for himself the responsibility of settling this pivotal question of the time, as to which popular sentiment is now so earnest and so nearly unanimous, without having matured a plan for its solution which will satisfy public opinion by securing to this country permanently the practical advantages we have won in war.

The New Russo-Bulgarian Entente.

The reconciliation of Russia and Bulgaria after nearly thirteen years of estrangement has just received formal ratification in the reception of Prince FERDINAND of Bulgaria, accompanied by the Princess MARIE and their son Prince BORIS, by the Czar and Czarina at Peterhof. The reception of the Prince of Bulgaria, although strictly in accordance with the etiquette prescribed in the case of a vassal prince of another sovereign, was marked by much cordiality and friendliness. Great public interest was manifested in young Prince BORIS, the grandson of the Czar, who was specially honored by his imperial grandfather at the official banquet given in honor of the Bulgarian visitors.

This visit of the Bulgarian Prince to the Russian Czar and the circumstances connected with it, make it of special significance. It has become possible only through the disappearance from the stage of Bulgarian politics of the late M. STAMBOULOFF. His successor, M. STOLOFF, has always been in favor of the maintenance of the most friendly relations with Russia, compatible with the independence of Bulgaria, as well as with the suzerain power, Turkey, and the other States of the Balkan Peninsula. His efforts to that end appear to have been entirely successful, owing to the abandonment of the policy of chauvinistic isolation from the other Balkan States and the defiance of Russia followed by M. STAMBOULOFF during his tenure of power.

What the consequences of the newly cemented entente between Bulgaria and Russia may be will develop with time. One of the immediate results is the permission given to a number of Bulgarians who took part in the events connected with the deposition of Prince ALEXANDER of Battenberg to return to their native country. They will do, wiser from their past experience. One of the Russian papers has already hinted at the elevation of Prince FERDINAND to the kingly rank, but it is too early to speak of that yet. Other powers besides Russia would have to concur in the change, which could not be made without causing complications and perhaps active trouble. For the moment Prince FERDINAND will have to be content with the very substantial gain he has made in procuring the official and friendly recognition of Russia, to whose sac-

rifices the Bulgarians owe their liberation from Turkish rule.

Relieved also by the reconciliation with Russia from the innumerable anxieties attending Bulgaria's former isolated position, the Bulgarian Government will be left free to carry on the work of internal development to which M. STOLOFF attaches so much importance. There are the connections to be made between the Bulgarian railways and the Salonica line, which will give Bulgarian trade an outlet on the Aegean and direct communication with the Mediterranean ports and western Europe without making the long detour from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The perfecting of the railway and other communications between southern Bulgaria and the Danube, and the harbor works on the Black Sea, is also to be done. This will be entirely in accord with the policy of Russia and the other neighbors of Bulgaria, which is that of peace. The personal exchanges of friendly assurances that exist between Prince FERDINAND and the other sovereigns of the Balkan States since the close of the Greco-Turkish war, have removed the danger of the general scramble for Macedonia that at one time seemed imminent, and have given a much more satisfactory turn to Bulgarian affairs generally than they have had for some years past. The reconciliation with Russia has been the rounding off of the situation.

The Secretary of State and the Peace Commission.

We do not know how much foundation there is for the persistent reports from Washington that the Secretary of State, the Hon. WILLIAM R. DAY of Canton, intends to resign his office as soon as affairs with Spain are settled. There seems to be in Mr. DAY the making of a valuable public servant in a distinguished statesman. Under difficult circumstances, and without previous experience in diplomacy, except as the born qualities of the diplomat find play in a country lawyer's restricted field of practice, he has sustained his part in the great drama of 1898 to the general satisfaction of the country, and with much credit both to himself and to the chief who chose him.

Mr. McKinley's confidence in Mr. DAY's fitness for heavy responsibilities at a critical time was based on intimate personal knowledge of his character. Mr. DAY's loyalty to the President is limited only by the requirements of the Secretary's moral and intellectual conscience. His fidelity to his own sense of duty is undoubted. He is a man of opinions, without arrogance of opinion; a man of personal force and personal tactfulness, modest and unassuming as an individual; altogether the sort of American to which the American heart takes kindly, with good wishes for political success and historical eminence.

Yet, assuming two things to be true, first, that the Secretary of State means to remain in the Cabinet until the immediate questions of peace-making are settled, and, secondly, that such influence as he can exert meanwhile in the Administration is to be exerted against the policy of courage and far-seeing wisdom in dealing with the Philippines, it must be said with all candor that the greatest service in Mr. DAY's power to render to his friend, the President of the United States, would be to resign now, at once, retiring from public life before the appointment of the American Peace Commissioners.

There is no good reason why a Secretary of State should not himself be a member of the Commission to negotiate the treaty with Spain. There is no good reason why the President should not put upon that Commission one who would be regarded not only as his principal Cabinet adviser, but also, in a peculiar and unusual degree, as his personal representative. But there are a hundred thousand strong reasons, deeply concerning the interests of the nation and President McKinley's fame for all future time, why no Secretary of State and no personal friend of the President should carry into the preliminary, yet probably decisive, work intrusted to the Commission either a preconceived hostility to the general idea of American expansion in the Far East, or a purpose or willingness to surrender under any circumstances or upon any consideration the matchless opportunity which DREWY won for the United States and which he and MERRITT are holding open for the United States at this moment.

The Secretary of State needed during the next few months is a statesman of the Seward stamp—like unto SEWARD in patriotic imagination, foresight and courage. The Peace Commissioners needed to represent the President personally at whatever capital may be selected for the parley with Spain, is a statesman thoroughly awake to the fact that he is largely to shape the verdict of history upon the success or failure of the McKinley Administration; whether it will be remembered through the centuries as the Administration which rightly interpreted the people's faith in the presence of an unparalleled opportunity, or as one which thwarted destiny through misjudgment or indecision.

If the Hon. WILLIAM R. DAY is not such a man, we repeat that his best service to the President is to resign now, before the damage is done. But if he is such a man, God-speed to his intellect and his courage as the people in their Secretary of State, and fortunate is WILLIAM McKinley!

Our Army in Porto Rico.

A first glance at the campaign going on in Porto Rico may suggest to the observer that our forces are scattering in every direction. Moving eastward from Juana Diaz, on the military road, is the column of Gen. WILSON. Moving northward by way of Adjuntas toward Arecibo, on the north coast, is the command of Gen. HENRY. Moving westward from Yauco toward Mayaguez, on the west coast of the island, are Gen. SCHWAB's forces. Finally, in the southeastern corner, at Guayama, is a portion of Gen. BROOKS's corps, headed northward for Cayey. The map which we have several times published will show that here are four distinct lines of advance, one east, a second west, and two others north, but distant from each other by more than half the island.

Ordinarily it might be thought that these dispositions violated the primary rules not to divide forces so that the enemy might concentrate against and overwhelm one part of them; and, when proceeding against a common objective from several bases, to do so by converging lines. But a second glance will show that the skilled officers who are conducting the Porto Rico campaign are not only running no risks, but are proceeding on a sufficient knowledge of what the enemy can and what he cannot do, and are taking the opportunity to make an absolutely thorough conquest of every part of the island. It will be found that, as the Spanish forces are themselves scattered in various garrisons, we are moving so as to make

each of our surrender or retreat, and that all our roads, however circuitous, ultimately lead to San Juan.

Beginning with the forces immediately under Gens. BROOKS and WILSON, they are engaged in the best possible co-operation. The chief, or, at all events, a leading Spanish stronghold on the military road from Ponce to San Juan is in the mountains at Albionito. Accordingly, while Gen. WILSON has been moving directly against this point from Ponce through Juana Diaz, marching along the military road, Gen. BROOKS has been preparing to strike that road ten miles east of Albionito at Cayey, to which a wagon way leads north from Guayama. There can be no doubt of the soundness or success of this combination. The Spaniards may or may not fight before giving up Albionito, but give it up they must, their only choice being between retreat and surrender, to forces attacking them from both sides.

Turning to the two western columns, under Gens. SCHWAB and HENRY, we find a similar combination. Gen. STONE went on a reconnaissance some time ago from Ponce, through Adjuntas along the road toward Arecibo, which is on the north coast and connected by rail with San Juan. But westward are several important towns, and it is proposed to take them in, and leave no enemy in our rear as we turn eastward from Ponce and Arecibo to San Juan. This is the more important as the west is suspected of stubborn loyalty to Spain. Accordingly Gen. SCHWAB is marching northwest from Yauco, which was the first town we seized after the landing at Guanica. His course leads through Sabana Grande and San German to Mayaguez, after a side excursion to Cabo Rojo. Mayaguez, one of the principal Porto Rican towns, contains troops and defensive works, so that there, if anywhere outside of San Juan, resistance might fairly be expected. Supposing Mayaguez to be occupied, Gen. SCHWAB would proceed up the western coast through Aguadilla to Aguadilla, at the northwestern corner of the island, which is also important to be garrisoned. Thence he would turn sharply eastward toward Arecibo, a choice of roads being offered him along the coast, through Quebradillas and Hatillo, or in the interior, by Moca, Pappino, and Larea. The last road may be chosen, because on it is a Spanish garrison at Larea, a point important, like Albionito, in a military view, so that the enemy will probably be driven out of it.

It becomes evident, therefore, that the two columns of Gens. HENRY and SCHWAB are really in supporting distance of each other, and also that the advance of either disturbs the enemy in the front of the other and inclines him to escape toward San Juan while there is yet time. The same strategy, in short, is adopted there as in the southeast, and when the two columns have united at Arecibo, just as the other two columns are to unite at Cayey, from these last-named points there will be movements directly against San Juan, easterly along the railroad and northerly along the military road.

Gen. MILES's plans, which were formed carefully, in order to secure the complete conquest of the island, are still carried out as precisely as if no movements were not pending. This is well, because the Spanish officers in Porto Rico might offer battle in the hope to end the war with personal lustre for themselves. We do not want our triumph to be clouded by one repulse.

Territory Won in War.

It cannot be called a hard bargain if we require Spain to surrender all her possessions in the Pacific and the Gulf. History is full of treaties of peace involving far greater transfers of territory. Looking only at those which have immediately concerned America, the treaty of Paris, in 1763, required France to give up all the enormous areas she claimed on this continent, except two little fishing islands. The treaty which followed our war of the Revolution gave us territory compared with which all the Spanish area in the Antilles and in Asia is trivial. Mexico transferred to us, after our war with her, territory greatly exceeding in area the Philippines, Ladrones and Porto Rico.

These treaties, resulting from wars in which our country has taken part, were not exorbitant in their conditions. It proved to be well for the world that these transfers of territory were made, and well also for the people who inhabited the lands transferred. So will it be now. Porto Rico already cannot sufficiently show her joy at belonging to our republic, and why should not the Philippines share that feeling? It seems even for Spain's true interest to give them up, because she would probably be involved in costly wars and still be unable to hold them.

At all events, in taking them we should take only what we have fairly won.

No Senate Seat for Bailey.

The Hon. JOSEPH WELDON BAILEY seems to be the favorite butt for the slings and arrows of outrageous Fortune. He was supposed to be the leader of the Democrats in the House of Representatives, but he lost most of his temper and many of his followers in the last session and faint as is the prospect that the next House will be Democratic, the prospect that Mr. Bailey will be the Democratic candidate for Speaker is even fainter. He has a singular gift for taking the small side of any question; and his method of parliamentary leadership consists in opposing everything that the Republicans propose and losing his head at the very time when he most needs it. The Democratic side grew weary of him. His glory in the House has been little.

But there was the Senate to take refuge in. On the whole, Mr. BAILEY felt that the Senate was the best receptacle for a genius like him, too massive to be appreciated by the more volatile House. If Texas wanted something in the Websterian line, she could find something to her advantage by addressing J. W. B. Gainesville. The Hon. ROGER CHARLES MILES's shoes have been spoken for by the Hon. CHARLES CULBERTSON, but the term of the Hon. HORACE CHILTON as a Senator in Congress expires in 1901. Mr. BAILEY and his admirers agree in believing that he ought to succeed Mr. CHILTON. They have not as yet convinced Mr. CHILTON or a majority of the Texas Democrats.

Mr. BAILEY's thrilling performance of the part of a venerable statesman forbidding Hawaii to come into the Union was well received at Washington, but he thought that it might be shirking in Texas. So he pulled down his shirt bosom, which has a regrettable tendency toward expansion, and to the Texas Democratic Convention, prepared to wipe out the expansionists and impress the State with his majestic fitness to be a Senator. He objected to annexing anything, and wanted to deprive the islands of the sea of the honor of having a share in the renouveau of BAILEY. He fought long, if not very well, against expansion and CHILTON. Fought in sub-

committee, committee and convention; carried the fight to the last ditch, and was pitilessly thrust into the same by the heartless CHILTON and the rest of the expansionists. During the fight, Mr. BAILEY made several cords of "impassioned" speeches; lost his temper; "scooped at" WILLIAM L. MARCH'S Democracy; displayed his accustomed breadth of mind by saying that to adopt the platform which was adopted was to "endorse the policy of the Republican President," "argued that Porto Rico could not be admitted into the Union," opposed large appropriations for the navy; said the adoption of the platform "meant that the Democrats wanted to fall in behind the Republican party," and that "two parties cannot occupy the same side of a great question," declared that "this is not a fight for territorial acquisition, it is a Senatorial race," and was beaten by a vote of 721 to 834.

Thus territorial expansion triumphed, and the expansion of the Hon. JOE BAILEY was rudely checked. Even his noble refusal to wear evening clothes was forgotten, and the Hon. JAMES STEPHEN HOOE, expansionist, was called upon to talk about "dress reform." Of such was the late Democratic Convention at Galveston.

The heavy hand of the Commander-in-Chief laid on the tongues or pens of some of his subordinates in both army and navy, line and staff, would be an extremely salutary influence just now.

A powerful Democratic organ, the St. Louis Republic, here delivers a crushing anathema upon the policy of Philippine annexation: "The view that we should seize everything that a broken and helpless enemy will surrender, is the sentiment of greedy plutocracy."

Before the awful accusation of "plutocracy" annexation must melt like June snow. What, said BURNHAM, to his afterwards panic-stricken rival, "if I should curse you?"

Municipal reform is beautiful but costly. The City Council of Detroit voted \$5,000 for the entertainment of the League of American Municipalities last week. According to the Indianapolis Journal, the Council "has the right to expend \$2,000 and no more," and the persons who are the League's benefactors provided it with illuminations and amusements, are getting anxious about their little bills. But it is the essence of municipal reform to be expensive. Detroit should remember the honor done to it by the visit of the League and pay without a murmur.

For several days the Hon. GAMALIEL BRADFORD has not called upon his "fellow Democrats of Massachusetts" to arise and butt their heads against destiny. What calls GAMALIEL? Is he doing in a hammock while the "imperialists" are dragging the country to ruin? Or is he pacing the stern and rock-hewn corridors of the State House, shouting his billows by shouting one of his alarms at them? Thinkers like him have no moral right to take a vacation.

The Missouri Democratic State Convention meets to-day, and the Hon. CHAMPE CLARK is expected to deliver a stirring address upon expansion, renominating the Hon. SAM COOK for Chairman of the State Committee, and otherwise disport himself. The Hon. DAVID DE ARMOND, another Missouri Representative in Congress who looks up to himself as a leader, has a large invoice of thought to the effect that the Missouri Democracy, which is uncommonly rich in statesmen choking with eloquence.

The Hon. FRELIX COBB, Populist candidate for Attorney-General of Georgia, is an orator of much industry and perhaps of singular merit, but there is a regrettable lack of demand for his services. He has been in Washington for other day, but as nobody would go to hear him he retained his music. Perhaps Waycross doesn't care for the fine arts. Yet why did Mr. Cobb fail to release his imprisoned voice? If he is a genuine Populist he speaks for his own satisfaction, not that of others, and is his own sufficient and favorite audience.

The Beautiful Island of Guam.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN:—Sir: In your editorial article this morning you refer in laudatory terms to the capture of the island of Guam, and with it the Ladrones group. If I could find fitting words I would like to do so, but you have exhausted the subject. I read the account with the greater interest, having traversed over the coral-belted bay in an American whaler out in 1848. But let your Government give up these islands. I was wrecked on Tinian in the year stated and was one of five saved from the ship Canton voyaging from Sydney to Hong Kong, but cast away in a typhoon. We were a month on this lovely island, then leaving with the loss of a few men and a few animals, and wild, which were shot by natives under a Spanish Sergeant, died in the end and transported in canoes to Guam for the support of the garrison there. Arrowroot and salt were also manufactured.

It has also a historical side. It was here that Commodore Anson took his ship, the Centurion, when nearly all the crew were down with scurvy. She was the surviving ship of his squadron. Here he landed his sick and took command of the island. He speaks of the island in raptures. One day they looked seaward and the Centurion had disappeared, and did not turn up for a month. In the meantime the Commodore had been busy building a ship to carry his crew, and he had taken special notice of a skit-ton boat, brought her in. Here she was refitted and sailed with a crew all in the best of health and fell in and captured the rich Spanish galleon with over a million sterling in value on board. This was the last of the Centurion's adventures. He speaks of the island in raptures. One day they looked seaward and the Centurion had disappeared, and did not turn up for a month. In the meantime the Commodore had been busy building a ship to carry his crew, and he had taken special notice of a skit-ton boat, brought her in. Here she was refitted and sailed with a crew all in the best of health and fell in and captured the rich Spanish galleon with over a million sterling in value on board. This was the last of the Centurion's adventures.

Perhap one boat, the Canton's pinnace, may still be in existence. On all the islands were Spanish political prisoners.

Don't give up our beautiful Ladrones.

CHARLES MILES (an Englishman).

NEW YORK, AUG. 9.

Spanish Honor as Illustrated by a Spanish Stamp Dealer.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN:—Sir: I present to you herewith a beautiful stamp of "Spain's Honor" in the shape of the translation of a letter received by our secretary from a correspondent in Buenos Aires, who has been to the island and may prove to be a source of interest and amusement.

JOHN R. BROWN AND CO. STAMPS, LIMITED.

NEW YORK, AUG. 8, 1898.

DEAR SIR: Since Jan. 27, 1897, I owe you a balance of \$109.39, and I had hoped that in the meantime I would be able to prepare a good shipment of stamps, as this would have been a more convenient means for me of settling the account than by payment in money, as you can imagine.

I notify you to-day that on the 27th of April last I have sent this sum, plus \$10.39 for fifteen months' interest at four per cent., total \$119.78, to the Committee of the House of Representatives, who have not as yet paid me, and I am obliged to you to pay me the amount of this sum, as you can imagine.

P. S.—I may also add that the amount which I have lost in your country through merchants of high standing, who have owed me money and have not paid, exceeds the amount involved in your claim.

Americans and Their To-Morrow.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN:—Sir: I wish to express the keen delight I experienced in reading Senator Baileys magnificent contribution to THE SUN of to-day. It ought to be the backbone of every war-cry of the country, and it is a pity that it is not our manifest destiny and view with regard to our national enlargement. That latter ought to be reprinted and spread broadcast over the country, and I might remark incidentally, the columns of THE SUN constitute a fitting frame for such a glorious picture.

ROBERT FORTUNE.

NEW YORK, AUG. 8.

THE GLORY OF THE WAR.

The Deficiencies Trivial as Compared with the Difficulties Overcome.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN:—Sir: I am not surprised that with the cessation of active military operations at Santiago there arises in the debilitated army a confused clamor of charges, counter-charges, bitter criticism, and angry recrimination, but I am surprised at the official tolerance which has made possible the publication of them to the world, and at the inconsiderate and unphilosophic treatment they are receiving at the hands of newspapers at home. The great glory to the American army, to the American navy, and, incidentally, to our whole system of Government, brought in one of the most uniformly successful wars in all history, is clouded by injurious aspersions upon individual officers and particular corps. We hear bickering over the responsibility for defects and shortcomings which are inherent in every system of military organization and administration, and are relatively more superficially only. What sort of demonstration of our fitness for national expansion are we offering to the world when even a brief war of three months is published as a flaming advertisement of our incompetence and our lack of serious military preparations, although the victory obtained by it against an organized military State was complete and absolute?

These defects, as exhibited at Santiago, more particularly in a few instances of the care of the sick and wounded and in their transportation, these are, after all, only superficial blemishes, and they were inevitable. Every military man who had passed through the experience of our civil war, more especially in its early days, expected them as a matter of course, and is only astonished that they have been so few and relatively so trifling as compared with the amount of serious military preparation which we have made. Except for the 25,000 men of the regular establishment, we had to improvise a great army. The campaign in Cuba, carried on in the unhealthy season and under the material and physical conditions due to Spanish misgovernment in that island, has been a costly and a large one, and it is dictated by military opinion, by Gen. Miles, for instance. Succeeding the capture of Santiago and following the shock of the army's tremendous and unintermitted exertions and excitement, its exposure and its other unpreventable hardships, the troops subsided to malaria fever, and inevitably a large number of them, about three-quarters, as Gen. Shafter reports, fell a prey to such diseases, but, as the sanitary reports sent by him daily prove, the disability was not usually serious or long continued. The number of fever cases returned to duty has been greater than the number of new recruits. The death rate has been alarmingly low, considering the circumstances, it has been gratifyingly low, not greatly exceeding the rate in camps of rendezvous and training established in our own country. Thus it affords evidence of general military and special medical administration creditable to both the line and the staff of the army.

As a medical periodical of Philadelphia has remarked recently, a war is not usually regarded as a sanitary excursion. The medical department must wait on the necessities of military strategy. Life and health are considerations subordinate to the end essential to be attained. War is a killing business. But, surely, we have accomplished the purpose we set out to compass in this war with a surprisingly small loss of life actually and proportionately, more especially when we take into the account the circumstance that the field of war has been in tropical regions wholly, and our army has been composed of men who have never before been exposed to the West Indian climate, and who, moreover, and particularly Cuba, are the most fertile centres and sources of dangerous tropical diseases the world over, and we transported our forces thither at the very season when the danger of exposure to them was the greatest.

It is not to be denied that the war has done much to the health of the nation, and we got off far better than we had reason to expect and far better than our enemy had confidently predicted.

Instead of censorious criticism of our military administration, line and staff, our newspapers should rather be expressing gratitude to the military and medical departments for what they have accomplished. It is a comparatively small thing, but the job of taking Santiago was finished in short order, and already the troops engaged in it are coming back, while their surrendered enemy is preparing to embark for Spain. If history records many examples of a more skillful and more complete military administration, it is not necessary to point out a successful campaign in a time so brief. I should like to have them pointed out to me. The war of Germany against France involved merely the marching into the enemy's country of a thoroughly equipped and long-trained army, with a perfected military administration, and the result was a complete and decisive victory. The war of the United States against Spain, by long study of its every possible detail and contingency; a campaign conducted in a temperate climate, over roads made for military use, and actually used for centuries. Our campaign in Cuba was in a tropical climate; in the most pestiferous region of the world; and we had to make special provision of all the invading troops, with their munitions and supplies of food, medicine and clothing. This army had to march over by-roads—mere cattle tracks through tropical forests of a dense undergrowth—to conduct a campaign in a substantially barbarous and uncivilized country, and to do so, and to touch only to aggravate its difficulties. It was a country which had a powerful defensive preparation in its very climate and the misgovernment which had kept it infested with disease most destructive of the energy of an unaccustomed invading army. Relatively to the smallness of the force, the campaign was a triumph, and the result was a complete and decisive victory.

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